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Zink: Love v. Superior Court

LOVE V. SUPERIOR COURT:
MANDATORY AIDS TESTING
AND PROSTITUTION
KARIN ZINK*

The AIDS! epidemic has brought one of our most (undamental constitutional rights into sharp focus in California. The
relationship between the Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures and the government's ability to mandate AIDS testing was the topic of a
recent California case, Love v. Superior Court. 2 In a unanimous
decision the California Court of Appeal upheld section 1202.6
of the California Penal CodeS [hereinafter § 1202.6] mandating
AIDS testing of persons convicted of soliciting an act of prostitution. 4 The court held that the California law does not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
search and seizures despite the absence of a warrant, probable cause, or even individualized suspicion. 6
This case was decided against a background of recent
United States Supreme Court decisions upholding warrantless
government searches under the developing doctrine of "special
needs." In limited circumstances, this doctrine provides an
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable
cause requirements. 8
This note will review the development of the "special needs"
doctrine, analyze the Love court's application of the "special
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993.
1. AIDS is an acronym for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. AIDS is evidenced by the presence of antibodies to the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) in
a person's blood. Blacks Medical Dictionary 18 (35th ed. 1987). The terms "AIDS testing" and "HIV testing" will be used interchangeably in this note.
2. 226 Cal. App. 3d 736, 276 Cal. Rptr. 660 (1990), review denied Mar. 14, 1991.
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6 (West Supp. 1992).
4. Love, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 746.
5. 1d. at 743.
6. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (warrantless drug and alcohol testing of railroad employees following major train accidents
is constitutional under the "special needs" doctrine); Treasury Employees' v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656 (1989) (warrantless drug testing of Customs employees upheld under the
"special needs" doctrine); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (warrantless
inspection of the premises of a highly regulated business upheld under the "special
needs" doctrine).
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needs" test and demonstrate how the shortcomings of the
court's application and analysis endangers our privacy rights
under the Fourth Amendment.
I.

A.

HISTORY OF THE LOVE CASE:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

In 1988, the California Legislature adopted § 1202.6. 7 This
law orders AIDS testing8 and AIDS education9 for persons
convicted of soliciting an act of prostitution in violation of
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6 (West Supp. 1992) (codifying S.B. 1007 and enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 647(0,1202.1,1202.6 and 12022.85). The third and final revision of S.B. 1007 requires that persons convicted of prostitution and various sex
offenses submit to AIDS tests. The bill further provides for penalty enhancement for
subsequent convictions of prostitution and sexual offenses and AIDS education for convicted prostitutes. S.B. 1007, 1987-88 Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess., (as amended June 20,1988).
The original version of the bill, as introduced, required only testing and penalty
enhancement for prostitutes. S.B. 1007, 1987-88 Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess., (as amended
March 4, 1988). The second version added testing of sex offenders and the third and
final version added AIDS education for prostitutes and penalty enhancement for sex
offenders. S.B. 1007, 1987-88 Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess., (as amended May 4, and June 20,
1988).
8. CAL. PENAL CODE §1202.6:
(a) Notwithstanding Section 199.20, 199.21, and 199.22 of
the Health and Safety Code, upon the first conviction of any
person for a violation of subdivision (b) of Section 647, the
court shall, before sentencing or as a condition of probation, order the defendant ... to submit to testing for AIDS
in accordance with subdivision (e).
(b) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of a violation of
subdivision (b) of Section 647, the court shall, before sentencing, order the defendant to submit to testing for AIDS in
accordance with subdivision (e) .

•••
(e) The court shall order testing of every defendant as
ordered pursuant to subdivision (a) or (b) for evidence of antibodies to the probable causative agent of acquired immune
deficiency syndrome.

1d.
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6(d):
An AIDS prevention education program providing services,
at a minimum, shall include details about the transmission
of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), the etiologic agents
for AIDS, symptoms of the AIDS or AIDS-related conditions, prevention through avoidance or cleaning of needles,
sexual practices which constitute high risk, low risk, and no
risk (including abstinence), and resources for assistance if the
person decides to take the test for the etiologic agent for AIDS
and receives a positive test. The program also shall include
other relevant and preventative information as it becomes
available.

1d.
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section 647(b) of the California Penal Code 10 [hereinafter
§ 647(b)]. The statute directs the court to advise those
defendants who test positive that a subsequent conviction
under § 64 7(b) will be elevated from a misdemeanor to a felony.ll
In addition the statute requires that the test results be submitted to the defendant,12 the court,13 and the State Department
of Health Services. 1•. Confidentiality of the test results is
required by the statute 15 "except that the department [of
Health Services] shall furnish copies of any such report to a
district attorney upon request. "16 The law does not, how10. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(b) (West Supp. 1992). This subsection requires in pertinent part: "Every person who commits any of the following acts is guilty of disorderly
conduct, a misdemeanor: ... [IjI] (b) Who solicits, or who agrees to engage or who
engages in any act of prostitution .... As used in this subdivision, "prostitution"
includes any lewd act between persons for money or other consideration." 1d.
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6(c):
If the results of the tests described in the report are positive,
the court shall make certain that the defendant understands
the nature and meaning of the contents of the report and
shall further advise the defendant of the penalty established in Section 647<0 for a subsequent violation of subdivision (b) of Section 647.
1d. CAL. PENAL CODE 647<0:
In any accusatory pleading charging a violation of subdivision (b) of Section 647, if the defendant has been previously convicted one or more times of a violation of that
subdivision ... and in connection with one or more ofthose
convictions a blood test was administered ... with positive
test results, of which the defendant was informed, the previous conviction and the positive test results ... shall be
charged in the accusatory pleading. If the previous conviction and informed test results are found to be true by the trier
of fact or are admitted by the defendant, the defendant is
guilty of a felony.
Id.
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6(c): "At the sentencing hearing of a defendant
ordered to submit to testing for AIDS pursuant to subdivision (a) or (b), the court shall
furnish the defendant with a copy of the report submitted pursuant to subdivision (e)
and shall direct the clerk to note the receipt of the report by the defendant in the record
of the case." Id.
13. CAL. PENAL CODE §1202.6(e): "Notwithstanding Section 199.21 of the Health
and Safety Code, written copies of the report on the test shall be furnished to both of
the following: [IjI] (1) The court in which the defendant is to be sentenced. [IjI] (2) The
State Department of Health Services." 1d.
14. Id.
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6(0: "Except as provided in subdivisions (c) and (g),
the reports shall be confidential." Id.
16. CAL. PENAL CODE §1202.6(g): "The State Department of Health Services
shall maintain the confidentiality of the reports received pursuant to subdivision (e),
except that the department shall furnish copies of any such report to a district attorney upon request." Id.
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ever, impose on the district attorney any requirement of confidentiality.17
B.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

The Petitioners were convicted in San Francisco Municipal
Court of soliciting an act of prostitution in violation of §
647(b).18 Upon conviction, the Petitioners were ordered to
submit to AIDS testing pursuant to § 1202.6. 19 In an attempt
to challenge the constitutionality of the testing requirement,
a petition for a writ of mandate was filed in Superior Court on
behalf of Petitioners and all others similarly situated. 20 Upon
denial of the writ by the Superior Court, a petition was subsequently filed in the appellate court.21
The Petitioners' principal contention was that § 1202.6
violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. 22 The basis for the
objection was that the mandatory testing scheme violated the
Fourth Amendment because it authorizes a bodily intrusion for
the removal of blood and its subsequent chemical testing in the
absence of a warrant and probable cause. 23
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

UNITED'STATES SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT:

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that the people have a right to be free from
17. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6. Subsection (0 requires that the results disclosed
pursuant to subdivision (e), (disclosed to the court and the State Department of
Health Services), shall be confidential. Subdivisions (c) and (g) permit the disclosure
in certain limited circumstances, (subsection (c) allows the court to disclose the
results to the defendant and subsection (g) allows for the State Department of Health
Services to disclose the test results to district attorney upon request.) However,
Subdivision (0 does not require the district attorney to maintain the confidentiality
of the test result. [d.
18. Love v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. App. 3d 736, 739 (1990).
19. [d.

20. [d. at 739·40.
21. [d. at 740.
22. Love, 226 Cal. App. at 740. The Petitioners also argued that § 1202.6 violates
the due process and equal protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution. [d. at 747.
Finding little merit to these arguments, the court focused its analysis of § 1202.6 under
the Fourth Amendment. See infra notes 112·113 (brief discussion of the courts anal·
ysis of Petitioners' other arguments.)
23. [d.
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unreasonable searches and seizures. 24 The Supreme Court
has noted that "the basic purpose of this Amendment ... is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials. "25 In analyzing Fourth
Amendment violations, court must make the initial determination of whether a governmental search or seizure has
occurred. 26 The Supreme Court has defined a search as a government action which intrudes on an individuars reasonable
expectation ofprivacy.27 Because the Fourth Amendment does
not proscribe all searches, but only those that are unreasonable,
a court must then determine whether the search is reasonable.26 The reasonableness of a search is dependant, in part, on
24. U.S CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to searched, and the
persons or things to be searched.

[d.
25. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,528 (1967). The Supreme Court
reversed the defendants conviction for failure to allow a warrantless search of his home
for housing code violations. [d. at 523. The Court held that area housing inspections
were reasonable only if conducted pursuant to a warrant. [d. at 532. However,
rather than imposing the usual probable-cause requirement, the Court held that
probable-cause existed if there were reasonable legislative or administrative standards
governing the inspection. [d. at 538.
26. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989). The
court upheld FRA [Federal Railroad Administration] regulations mandating warrantless substance abuse testing of certain railroad employees following major railroad accidents. [d. at 634. Analyzing the threshold question of whether a governmental
search or seizure has occurred, the Court stated that a compelled physical intrusion
into the body for blood "must be deemed a Fourth Amendment search" and that the
chemical analysis of the sample is a further privacy invasion. [d. at 616.
27. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967). The Court held that evidence
of a telephone conversation obtained by use of an electronic device without a warrant
was inadmissible. [d. at 359. The court found that a search had occurred because the
defendant had an expectation that his conversations on a public telephone would be
private and society recognized that expectation of privacy. [d. at 353; New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338 (1985). The Court held that the warrantless search by school
officials of a student's property did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In finding that
students have a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court stated that "to receive
the protection of the Fourth Amendment, an expectation of privacy must be one that
society is 'prepared to recognize as legitimate'" [d. (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 526 (1984».
28. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966). The Court determined that
a warrantless blood alcohol test was a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment
because: (1) the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant while driving
under the influence; (2) the search was conducted incident to a valid arrest; and (3)
the delay involved in obtaining a warrant would result in a loss of evidence. [d. at 772.
The Court investigated the reasonableness under the circumstances of the warrantless search noting that the Fourth Amendment prohibits only those searches that are
unreasonable. [d. at 768.
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the type of search the government is conducting. 29 There are two
categories of governmental searches as defined by the Supreme
Court: criminal searches and administrative searches. 30
A criminal search involves a governmental intrusion with
the intent to procure evidence to be used in a criminal pro. ceeding. 31 With few exceptions, a criminal search is reasonable
only if executed pursuant to a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate. 32 For a search warrant to be issued there must be
probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime will be discovered. 33
An administrative search involves a governmental intrusion
with the intent to obtain information to be used to ensure
compliance with regulations or to protect public health and
safety. 34 Because administrative searches address problems
unlike those addressed in normal law enforcement activities,
the Supreme Court has recognized that administrative searches generally cannot be dealt with adequately using the Fourth
29. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (reasonableness depends on all the circumstances
surrounding the search and the nature of the search itselO; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337
(reasonableness of a search is dependant on the context in which the search takes
~~~
.
30. Note, AIDS, Rape and the Fourth Amendment: Schemes for Mandatory AIDS
Testing of Sex Offenders, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1618 (1990).
31. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 355 (telephone wiretapping during police investigation
constituted a criminal search because it was conducted to obtain evidence that Katz
was involved in illegal activities); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 757 (a blood alcohol test
involved a criminal search because it was used to discover evidence ofintoxication for
a drunk driving arrest).
32. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770. The Court stated that the Fourth Amendment
requires that a neutral and detached magistrate determines whether the evidence supports the issuance of a search warrant. Id.
33. Id. See also U. S. CONST. amend. IV: ("no Warrants shall issue, but on probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched"); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,238 (1983) (probable cause is a practical, common-sense decision by a magistrate that, given all the circumstances, there
is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place).
34. See Skinner v. Railway Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (blood alcohol testing conducted pursuant to FRA [Federal Railroad Administration] regulations
are administrative searches because they are conducted to ensure railroad safety by
detecting substance abuse in railroad employees); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S.
709 (1987) (search ofa doctor's office by state hospital officials constituted an administrative search because it was conducted to ensure the efficient operation of the work
place); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (search ofa student's property by
school officials constituted an administrative search because it was conducted to maintain discipline in the school rather than to obtain evidence of criminal activity);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (housing inspection by an inspector of the Department of Public Health constituted an administrative search because
it was conducted to ensure compliance with the housing code by investigating code
violations).
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Amendment's warrant and probable cause restrictions. 35 As a
result, the Court has decided that administrative searches
must be judged by a different standard. 36
The standard for administrative searches was first articulated by the Supreme Court in Camara v. Municipal Court.37
In holding that area housing inspections could be conducted
pursuant to a warrant issued on less than the usual quantum
of probable cause, the court stated that reasonableness was
still the ultimate standard but that "there can be no ready test
for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the
need to search against the invasion which the search
entails. "38
The Court noted that "[ w ]here considerations of health
and safety are involved, the facts that would justify an inference of 'probable cause' to make an inspection are clearly different from those that would justify such an inference where
a criminal investigation has been undertaken. "39 The Court
found that "probable cause to issue a warrant to inspect must
exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for
conducting the area inspection are satisfied. "40
35. Camara, 387 U.S. at 533:
In assessing whether the public interest demands creation
of a, general exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement, the question is not whether the public interest
justifies the type of search in question, but whether the
authority to search should be evidenced by a warrant, which
in turn depends in part upon whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose
behind the search.

[d.
36. [d. at 534.

37. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
38. [d. at 536-37.
39. Camara, 387 U.S. at 538, (quoting Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 383
(1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting».
40. Camara, 387 U.S. at 538:
Such standards, which will vary with the municipal program being enforced, may be based on the passage of time,
the nature of the building (e.g., a multi-family apartment
house), or the condition of the area, but they will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the
particular dwelling.
[d. See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1822.52 (West 1990): "Cause shall be deemed to
exist if either reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting a routine or area inspection are satisfied with respect to the particular place ... , or there
is reason to believe that a condition of nonconformity exists with respect to the particular place ...• [d.
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In its application of this balancing theory, the Court
focused on three factors in determining the reasonableness
of the governmental inspection: (1) the history of judicial and
public acceptance; (2) the strong public interest in combatting the problem; and (3) the relatively limited privacy
invasion,4!
The Camara 42 balancing test has been applied in numerous
contexts in California, including agricultural inspections/3
inspection of business records for licensing,.' and regional
water control. 46 Since Camara,46 however, the Court has
expanded the scope of administrative searches to allow warrantless searches under the developing doctrine of "special
needs" ,47 A "special needs" situation exists when the individual's privacy interests are weakened, and the governmental
interests are concomitantly heightened causing the balance to
41. Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37:
[T)here can be no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing the need to search against the
invasion which the search entails. But ... a number of
persuasive factors combine to support the reasonableness of
area code-enforcement inspections. First, such programs
have a long history of judicial and public acceptance. Second,
the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be
prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable results ....
Finally, because the inspections are neither personal in
nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they
involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy.
1d. (citation omitted).
42. 387 U.S. 523.
43. See, e.g., Vidaurri v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. App. 2d 550,91 Cal. Rptr. 704
(1970) (inspections by the county agricultural commissioner require the issuance of
an inspection warrant as provided in Section 1822.50 of the CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE).
44. See, e.g., Pinney v. Phillips, 230 Cal. App. 3d 1570,281 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1991)
(inspections of the business records of an electrical contractor requires an inspection
warrant under CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1822.50 because the business was not closely
regulated).
45. See, e.g., Joseph v. Masonite Corp., 148 Cal. App. 3d 6, 195 Cal. Rptr. 629
(1983) (issuance of an inspection warrant to enter timberland and observe logging operations in order to determine whether there was compliance with water quality control provisions held constitutional).
46. 387 U.S. 523.
47. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
"Only in those exceptional circulllstances in which special needs, beyond the normal
need oflaw enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the
Framers." 1d. See also Skinner v. Railway Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619
(1989); Treasury Employees' v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989); O'Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
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be struck in favor of the governmental search. 48 When faced
with a "special need", courts have "not hesitated to balance the
governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality
of the warrant and probable cause requirements in a particular context. "49 The "special needs" doctrine has been employed
to uphold searches in numerous contexts involving special
circumstances, including searches of school children,50 border
searches,51 and searches of the desks and offices of public
employees. 52
While the "special needs" doctrine has developed in an ad
hoc fashion, the Supreme Court helped to clarify the doctrine
in Burger v. New York. 53 The Court found the "special needs"
doctrine applicable to the warrantless search of an automobile
junk yard, stating that the privacy interests of the defendant
were reduced due to his participation in a closely regulated
industry54 and the government interests were heightened
because of the increased problem of vehicle theft. 55 While the
Court struck the balance in favor of the government, it declared
48. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691,698 (1987). "Because the owner ... has a
reduced expectation of privacy, the warrant and probable-cause requirements, which
fulfill the traditional Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness for a governmental search, have a lessened application in this context." 1d. (citations omitted). "[A]s
in other situations of "special need" where the privacy interests of the owner are weakened and the government interests in regulating particular businesses are concomitantly
heightened, a warrantless inspection of commercial premises may well be reasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." 1d. at 698-99 (citations omitted).
49. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (emphasis added). See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987) (the warrantless search of a probationer's home constitutional
under "special needs"); Burger, 482 U.S. at 699-703 (the warrantless search of the
premises of a highly regulated business was held to be constitutional under "special
needs"); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979) (the warrantless body cavity search
of a prison inmate was upheld under the "special needs" doctrine).
50. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 325. In this case the Supreme Court held that the warrantless search of a student's purse by school officials was constitutional.1d. at 34748. The Court found that the need for swift and informal disciplinary procedures
outweighed the intrusion to the students expectation of privacy. 1d. at 341.
51. United States v. Martinez-Fuentes, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). The Court was faced
with the constitutionality of routine vehicle stops at permanent checkpoints near the
Mexican border. 1d. The Court found that the need to safeguard our border along with
the impracticability of obtaining a warrant justified the warrantless search. 1d.
52. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987). In Ortega, the Court held that the
warrantless search of a state employee's office was constitutional. 1d. In balance the
Court found that the employee's reasonable expectation of privacy was outweighed by
the government's need for supervision, and efficient operation of the work place. 1d.
at 725.
53. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
54. 1d. at 698. "[T]he owner or operator of commercial premises in a closely regulated industry has a reduced expectation of privacy." 1d.
55. 1d. at 702. "In this day, automobile theft has become a significant social problem, placing enormous economic and personal burdens upon the citizens of different
states." 1d.
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that a warrantless search may be reasonable only upon meeting three criteria: 56 (1) a substantial governmental interest
which justifies the regulatory scheme under which the search
is conducted;57 (2) a warrantless inspection must be necessary
to further the regulatory scheme;56 and (3) the regulatory
scheme must serve as a constitutionally adequate substitute
for a search warrant. 59
Having decided that the junkyard search met these criteria, the Court went on to explain that although the purpose of
the statute was to deter criminal activity and the inspections
were conducted by police officers, the "special needs" exception
was still applicable because the primary purpose was not to
obtain evidence for use in a criminal proceeding.so
56. [d. at 699. "This warrantless inspection ... will be deemed to be reasonable
only so long as three criteria are met." [d.
57. [d. "[T]here must be a 'substanial' government interest that informs the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made." [d. The Court found that
the state had a substantial interest in regulating the vehicle-junkyard industry
"because motor vehicle theft has increased in the State and because the problem of theft
is associated with this industry." [d. at 710-12. See also Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S.
594,602 (1981) (the government has a substantial interest in improving the health
and safety of underground and surface mines); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 33940 (1985) (the state has a substantial interest in maintaining school security and providing an environment in which learning can take place).
58. Burger, 482 U.S. at 699. "[W]arrantless inspections must be 'necessary to further [the] regulatory scheme.'" [d. (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 600). The
Court found that a warrant requirement would frustrate the statute's purpose of deterring automobile theft "[b]ecause stolen cars and parts often pass quickly through an
automobile junkyard, 'frequent' and 'unannounced' inspections are necessary in order
to detect them." [d. at 703. See also Donovan, 452 U.S. at 600 (the warrantless mine
inspections were necessary because forcing inspectors to obtain a warrant before each
inspection would frustrate the purpose of the inspection by possibly alerting owners
and operator of the mines of impending inspections); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340 (requiring school officials to obtain a warrant before searching a student would interfere with
the swift and informal disciplinary procedure need in schools and thus frustrate the
government purpose behind the search); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876
(1987) (requiring a warrant before searching probationers would interfere with the probation system by substituting a magistrate for a probation officer as the judge of how
extensively a probationer requires supervision and by causing a delay in the probation officers response to evidence of misconduct by the probationer).
59. Burger, 482 U.S. at 699 "[T]he statute's inspection program, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application, [must] provid[e]a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant" [d. (quoting Donovan, 452 U.S. at 603). The Court held that "the
regulatory statute must perform the two basic functions of a warrant: it must advise the
owner of the commercial premises that the search is being made pursuant to the law and
has a properly defined scope, and it must limit the discretion of the inspecting officer."
[d. at 699. The Court held that this requirement was met, stating the "[t]he statute
informs the operator of a vehicle dismantling business that inspections will be made on
a regular basis, ... the 'time, place and scope' of the inspection is limited," and appropriate restraints are placed upon the discretion of the inspecting officers. [d. at 703.
60. Burger, 482 U.S. at 704. "[A] State can address a major social problem both
by way of an administrative scheme and through penal sanctions. Administrative

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss3/8

10

Zink: Love v. Superior Court

1992]

LOVE V. SUPERIOR COURT

805

It was not until 1989 that the Supreme Court extended the
scope of the "special needs" doctrine to allow warrantless
intrusions of an individual's body.61 In two companion cases,
Skinner v. Railway Executives' Ass'n and Treasury Employees'
v. Von Raab, the Court employed the "special needs" exception
to uphold searches of an individual's body and bodily fluids. 62
In Skinner,63 the Court upheld drug and alcohol testing of
railroad employees following major train accidents. 64 Applying
the "special needs" doctrine, the Court held that the privacy
interests of the employees were reduced due to the regulation
of the industry by the government65 and the government interest was heightened due to the need to regulate the conduct of
railroad employees to ensure the safety of the railroads. 66
Applying the three prong test laid out in Burger,67 the
Court first found that the government had a substantial interest in ensuring the overall safety of the railroads by regulating the conduct of railroad employees who engaged in safety
sensitive tasks. 68 Second, the Court found that the warrantless
statutes and penal laws may have the same ultimate purpose of remedying the social
problem, but they have different subsidiary purposes and prescribe different meth·
ods of addressing the problem." ld. (emphasis in original). "So long as a regulatory
scheme is properly administrative, it is not rendered illegal by the fact that the
inspecting officer has the power to arrest individuals for violations ...• ld. at 707. See
also United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 313 (1972) (the warrantless inspection of
a pawnshop licensed to sell firearms was constitutional despite the fact that the
information obtained during the inspection was used to prosecute the pawnshop
owner because the inspection was a valid administrative search. But see Sal wasser
Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Municipal Court, 94 Cal. App. 3d 223, 231, 156 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1979)
(inspections made pursuant to CaVOSHA (California Occupational Safety and Health
Act) subject to the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement because of the
possible penal consequences of CallOSHA).
61. Skinner, 489 U.S. 602.
62. ld.; Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656.
63. 489 U.S. 602.
64. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) pro·
mulgated regulations that mandate blood and urine tests ofrailroad employees who
are involved in certain railroad accidents. ld.
65. ld. at 627. "The expectations of privacy of covered employees are diminished
by reason oftheir participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure
safety, a goal dependant, in substantial part, on the health and fitness of covered
employees." ld.
66. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628. The Court found that the government has a com·
pelling interest in the testing of railroad employees. Stating that "[e]mployees sub·
ject to the tests discharge duties fraught with such risk of injury to others that even
a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences." ld.
67. 482 U.S. 691.
68. ld. at 628.
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inspections were necessary to further the regulatory scheme. 69
Due to the rate that drugs and alcohol are depleted from the
bloodstream, the Court found that the delay in obtaining a warrant would frustrate the governmental interest. 70 In addition, the warrant requirement would detract from the deterrent
effect of the regulation, which is dependant on an effective
testing program. 71 Third, the Court found that the testing
program served as an adequate substitute for a warrant
because it narrowly defined the scope of the search, applied the
testing program with regularity, and gave the inspecting officers only limited discretion. 72
In Von Raab,73 the Court followed a similar analysis in
upholding drug testing of customs officials who participated in
drug interdiction or carried firearms." In its application of the
"special needs" doctrine, the Court held that, because the customs officials in question were involved in tasks which greatly impacted on public safety and welfare, they had a diminished
69. ld. at 624. The Court found that "imposing a warrant requirement in the present context would add little to the assurances of certainty and regularity already
afforded by the regulations, while significantly hindering, and in many cases frustrating, the objective of the Government's testing program." ld.
70. ld. at 623. The Court noted that since "alcohol and other drugs are eliminated
from the bloodstream at a constant rate, ... blood and breath samples taken to measure whether these substances were in the bloodstream when a triggering event
occurred must be obtained as soon as possible" and therefore "the delay necessary to
procure a warrant ... may result in the destruction of valuable evidence." ld. See also
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966).
71. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 629-30:
[C]ustomary dismissal sanctions that threatens the employees
who use drugs or alcohol while on duty cannot serve as an effective deterrent unless violators know that they are likely to be
discovered. By ensuring that employees in safety-sensitive positions know they will be tested upon the occurrence of a triggering event, the timing of which no employee can predict
with certainty, the regulations significantly increase the deterrent effect of the administrative penalties associated with the
prohibited conduct, concomitantly increasing the likelihood that
employees will forgo using drugs of alcohol while subject to
being called to duty.
ld. (citations omitted).
72. ld. at 622. The Court found that "[b]oth the circumstances justifying toxicological testing and the permissible limits of such intrusions are defined narrowly
and specifically in the regulations that authorize them, and doubtless are well known
to covered employees." ld.
73. 489 U.S. 656. The United States Customs Service promulgated a drug
screening program requiring urinalysis testing of employees seeking transfer or promotion to positions having direct involvement in drug interdiction or the requirement
of carrying firearms. ld. at 660-61.
74. ld. at 679. The Court held that warrantless drug testing of certain customs
officials was constitutional, finding that the privacy interest of covered employees was
outweighed by the government's interest in protecting the integrity of our borders. ld.
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expectation of privacy76 while the government had a heightened
interest in safeguarding the borders.76
Concluding that the testing program bore a close and substantial relation to the governmental goal,77 the Court struck
the balance in favor of the government inspection. 78 Applying
the Burger 79 three prong test, the Court concluded first that
the government had a substantial interest,80 and second, that
requiring a warrant would only divert agency resources81
while providing little additional protection to the employee. 82
Third, as it found in Skinner,83 the Court decided that the test75. Id. at 672:
Customs employees who are directly involved in the interdiction of drugs or who are required to carry firearms in the
line of duty ... have a diminished expectation of privacy in
respect to intrusions occasioned by the urine test. Unlike
most private citizens or government employees in general,
employees involved in drug interdiction reasonably should
expect effective inquiry into their fitness and probity. Much
the same is true of employees who are required to carry
firearms. Because successful performance of their duties
depends uniquely on their judgment and dexterity, these
employees cannot reasonably expect to keep from the Service
personal information that bears directly on their fitness.
Id.
76. Id. at 670. "It is readily apparent that the Government has a compelling interest in ensuring that front-line interdiction personnel are physically fit, and have
impeachable integrity and judgment." Id.
77. Id. at 676. The Court found that "the program bears a close and substantial
relation to the Service's goal of deterring drug users from seeking promotion to sensitive positions." Id.
78. Id. at 677. The Court held that the government's ·compelling interests in safeguarding our borders and the public safety outweigh the privacy expectations of
employees who seek to be promoted to positions that directly involve the interdiction
of illegal drugs or that require the incumbent to carry a firearm." Id.
79. 482 U.S. 691.
80. Id. at 666. The Court held that the Customs Service has a compelling interest in preventing the promotion of employees who use drugs to positions "where they
might endanger the integrity of our Nation's borders or the lives of the citizenry." Id.
81. Id. at 666-67:
Even if Customs Service employees are more likely to be
familiar with the procedures required to obtain a warrant
than most other Government workers, requiring a warrant
in this context would serve only to divert valuable agency
resources from the Service's primary mission. The Customs
Service has been entrusted with pressing responsibilities, and
its mission would be compromised ifit were required to seek
search warrants in connection with routine, yet sensitive,
employment decisions.
Id.
82. Id. at 667. The Court found that a warrant would provide little or no additional protection of the employee's privacy interests.
83. 489 U.S. 602.
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ing program served as an adequate substitute for a search
warrant. 84

B. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ACTION:
The state has the power and the duty to protect its citizenry
from the spread of communicable diseases. 86 To accomplish this,
the state may take the steps necessary to prevent the spread
of any contagious disease including quarantines,86 inspections,87 and disinfection. 88
Since 1985, California law has distinguished AIDS from
other communicable diseases by prohibiting AIDS testing
without written consent. 89 The California Legislature not only
increased the privacy rights of the citizens by prohibiting
compulsory AIDS testing, the Legislature provided for both civil
and criminal sanctions for unauthorized disclosure of test
results to further ensure the protection of these rights. 90
84. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 667. The Court found that testing program was
defined narrowly and specifically and that covered employees are doubtlessly aware
of the testing program and that they are not subject to the discretion of the officer conducting the tests. 1d.
85. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 3051 (West 1990): "The state department may
quarantine, isolate, inspect and disinfect persons, animals, houses, rooms, other
property, places cities or localities, whenever in its judgment such action is necessary
to protect or preserve the public health." 1d.; CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 3110
(West 1990): "Every health officer knowing or having reason to believe that any case
of the diseases made reportable by regulation of the State Department of Health
Services, or any other contagious, infectious or communicable disease exists, or has
recently existed, ... shall take such measures as may be necessary to prevent the
spread of the disease or the occurrence of additional cases." 1d.
86. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 40 Cal. App. 242, 180 P. 644 (1919) (quarantine of
persons afflicted with and suffering from gonococcus infection, (including: leprosy,
smallpox, and typhus fever) held to be a valid exercise of the state's power to protect
public health).
87. See, e.g., In re Clement, 61 Cal. App. 666, 215 P. 698 (1923) (police detention
of a proprietor ofa house of prostitution and the testing of her blood for venereal disease held to be a valid exercise of the state's police power).
88. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (Supreme Court held
that it is within the police power of the state to enact a compulsory smallpox vaccination law to protect the public health).
89. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 199.22 (West SUpp. 1992). This section provides that "no person shall test, a persons blood for evidence of antibodies to the probable causative agents of AIDS without the written consent of the subject of the test." [d.
90. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.21 (West SUpp. 1992):
(a) Any person who negligently discloses results of an HIV
test ... to any third party ... except pursuant to a written
authorization ... or any other statute that expressly provides
an exemption to this section, shall be assessed a civil penalty in the amount not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000)
plus court costs, ... which penalty and costs shall be paid to
the subject of the test.
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However, in 1988 the California Legislature passed several bills excluding certain groups from these privacy protections.
These bills established exceptions to the 1985 AIDS consent
requirements for testing and disclosure by authorizing compulsory AIDS testing of certain criminal defendants,91 prison
inmates,92 and prostitutes93 .
III.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS:

The court of appeal in Love began its analysis with the
threshold question of whether the blood tests mandated by §
1202.6 of the California Penal Code constituted a search under
the Fourth Amendment. 94 In its determination that the blood
(b) Any person who willfully discloses the results of an HIV
test ... to any third party ... except pursuant to a written
authorization. . . or any other statute t}:lat expressly provides
an exception to this section, shall be assessed a civil penalty in the amount not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000)
and not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) plus court
costs ... which penalty and costs shall be paid to the subject
of the test.
(c) Any person who willfully or negligently discloses results
of an HIV test ... to any third party ... except pursuant to
a written authorization ... or any other statute that expressly provides an exemption to this section, which results in economic, bodily or psychological harm to the subject of the
test, is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment
in the county jail for a period not to exceed one year or a fine
not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or both.
(d) Any person who commits any of the act described in
subdivision (a) or (b) shall be liable to the subject for actual damages, including damages for economic, bodily, or psychological harm which is a proximate result of the act.
(e) Each disclosure made in violation of this chapter is a separate and actionable offense.

1d.
91. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.96 (West Supp. 1992) (defendants charged
with various sexual offenses subject to compulsory AIDS testing at the written
request of the victim if the court finds that probable cause exists to believe that a possible transfer of bodily fluids occurred); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.1 (West Supp.
1992) (mandatory AIDS testing of defendants convicted ofvarious sexual crimes); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §l99.97 (West Supp. 1992) (persons charged with interfering
with the duties ofa peace officer, fire fighter, or emergency medical personnel by biting, scratching, spitting must submit to AIDS testing upon finding probable cause to
believe there was a transfer of bodily fluids).
92. CAL. PENAL CODE § 7500 (West Supp. 1992) (compulsory AIDS testing ofprisoners in order to protect the health and safety of custodial and law enforcement personnel, other inmates, probation and parole officers and prison supervisory and
medical personnel).
93. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6 (West Supp. 1992) (mandatory AIDS tests for persons convicted of soliciting and act of prostitution).
94. Love v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 736, 740 (1990).
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tests mandated by § 1202.6 constitute a search, the court
noted that it is undisputed that "compulsory blood tests are
searches subject to the Fourth Amendment, not only because
physical penetration for the removal of bodily fluid, but because
of the subsequent chemical testing leading to the revelation of
private medical 'information. "95
The court next made a cursory inquiry into whether the
AIDS tests involved a criminal or administrative search. 96
The Petitioners contended that the statute involved a criminal
search because the tests were conducted with the intent to
obtain evidence to be used in criminal proceedings for future
prostitution convictions. 97 Relying on the educational provisions 98 of the statute, the court rejected this argument stating
that a reading of the section without taking into account the
educational provision was not a fair interpretation of the legislative intent. 99
The court instead concluded that based on "[t]he provisions of the act, the legislative history of the act and recent findings of the Legislature,"loo the legislative intent of the statute
was controlling the spread of AIDS.lol While the court concluded that the statute serves an obvious and compelling governmental "special need", it declined to state that this
constituted an administrative rather than a criminal search.
The court applied the "special needs" balancing test by
comparing the extent of the privacy invasion with the extent
of the government interest. 102 In its examination of the privacy
intrusion, the court considered the intrusion of a blood test and
the intrusion of a chemical analysis of the blood. 103
95. 1d. (citing Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App.1255, 1272-73,267 Cal.
Rptr. 666, 675 (1990». See Skinner v. Railway Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989).
"[P]hysical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The ensuing chemical analysis
of the sample to obtain physiological data is a further invasion of the tested employee's
privacy interests." 1d. See also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966).
96. Love, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 742.
97. 1d. at 743. Petitioners suggested that the search was merely a search for evidence to be used in the future.
98. CAL PENAL CODE § 1202.6(d). See supra note 9.
99. Love, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 743. "This argument, however, by focusing on the
testing requirement, does not constitute a fair reading of the statute because the argument ignores the significant educational provisions of the section." 1d.
100. Id. at 742.
101. Id. at 742-43.
102. Id. at 744.
103. 1d. at 744-46.
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Relying on a line of Supreme Court cases addressing the
issue of compulsory blood tests,104 the court found that the
physical aspects of drawing blood involve only a minimal privacy intrusion. 105 In response to the Petitioners' argument
that the chemical testing of their blood would constitute a
substantial privacy intrusion,I06 the court acknowledged that
§ 1202.6 failed to provide for the confidentiality of the test
results by the district attorney. 107 The court then accepted
the People's interpretation of the statute that restricted the district attorney's use of the test results to purposes consistent
with the legislative intent of the statute. 108
Having thus concluded that both the physical and chemical aspects of the testing scheme constitute only minimal privacy intrusions, the court considered the extent of the
governmental interest in preventing the spread of AIDS.I09
Deferring to the Legislature regarding public health and safety justifications for AIDS testing of convicted prostitutes, the
court held that the statute served a compelling governmental
"special need" and that this need outweighed the privacy interests of prostitutes. 110
104. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966). The Supreme Court held
that a blood test is not significant since "blood tests are common place in these days
of periodic physical examinations and experience with them teaches that the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and that for most people the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma or pain." 1d. See alBo Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625; South Dakota
v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 563 (1983) (blood alcohol tests are safe, painless and commonplace); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436 (1957) (blood tests are routine in
our every day life).
105. Love, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 744.
106. [d. at 746. The Petitioners contended that the statute involved a substantial privacy intrusion because.the chemical testing would reveal private medical
data since the statute failed to provide for confidentiality. [d.
107. [d.
108. [d. at 744-46. The court noted that the aim of § 1202.6 is in part to deter
prostitution by persons known to be infected with the AIDS virus by providing for
penalty enhancement for subsequent convictions and that the prosecutor must have
access to the results of the tests to enforce the penalty provisions of§ 1202.6. [d. at
745. Stating that "[tjhe statutory scheme envisions no other reason for the prosecutor to obtain or use such information," the court rejected the proposal that the district
attorney could use the test results for purposes unrelated to the statute. 1d. at 746.
109. [d.
110. [d. at 740. The court noted that the legislature is vested with a large discretion in determining what is a communicable disease and in adopting measures to
prevent the spread of communicable diseases. [d. Deferring to the Legislature's
authority, the court concluded that "the testing of persons convicted of violating section 647, subsection (b), and the penalty enhancement ... are means to deter acts
known to spread the disease," thus serving an "obvious and compelling 'special need'."
[d. at 743.
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Once the court concluded that the testing regime constituted
a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment,1I1 it concluded its analysis with a brief consideration of the Petitioners'
due process ll2 and equal protection arguments. 1I3
IV.

CRITIQUE:

The Supreme Court of the United States has developed a
three part test to be used when a court must determine whether
the "special needs" doctrine will allow a governmental search
without the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause
requirements. 1I4 The test evolved as a means to protect individual privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment in the
absence of the traditional privacy safeguards.
The Love court's application of the "special needs" test was
inadequate. By disregarding both constitutional and judicial
standards designed to protect Fourth Amendment rights, the
Love opinion threatens to deteriorate our right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.
111. Love, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 746.
112. 1d. at 746-47. The Petitioners argued that the statute violates the due
process clause of the Constitution because there is no reasonable relation between the
statutes means and ends since there may be no transfer of bodily fluids in the commission of an act that violates § 647(b).1d. at 746. The court rejected this argument
stating that whether there is a transfer of bodily fluids is largely irrelevant and
that what is relevant is whether the group being tested are members of an AIDS highrisk group and to what extent that group threatens to transmit the virus to the general population. 1d. at 747. The court then concluded that the Petitioners were
members of a high-risk group since they had been convicted of a violation of § 647(b)
from which the court concluded that it can be inferred that the Petitioners are sexually involved with mUltiple partners. 1d.
113. 1d. at 747. The Petitioners' final argument was that § 1202.6 denies them
equal protection because the statute contains no confidentiality requirement while
§ 1202.1 does and involves a far more serious offense. 1d. at 747. The court rejected
this argument on the same grounds that it rejected the Petitioners argument that the
statute failed to provide for confidentiality. 1d. See supra notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
114. SeP., e.g., Skinner v. Railway Executive's Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602; Treasury
Employees' v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656; Burger v. New York, 482 U.S. 691. See aLso
supra notes 47-52 and the accompanying text for a discussion of the "special needs"
test and its application by the Supreme Court. The "special needs" test requires: (1)
a finding of an administrative search (as opposed to a criminal search); (2) a balancing test in which a diminished privacy expectation is outweighed by a heightened governmental interest; and (3) fulfillment of the three criteria established in Burger. The
three criteria delineated in Burger are: (1) a substantial government interest must justify the regulatory scheme; (2) a warrantless search must be necessary to further the
regulatory scheme; and (3) the regulatory scheme must serve as adequate substitute
for a search warrant. 482 U.S. 691, 698-99.
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PART ONE: ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH:

The "special needs" doctrine provides an exception to the
traditional Fourth Amendment privacy safeguards only when
the government's purpose in conducting the search is administrative.lIs The Love court concluded that the state's purpose
behind § 1202.6 is controlling the spread of AIDS. liS The court's
conclusion was based on the educational provision of the actll7
and recent findings by the California Legislature. us In addition, the court found, based on a United States Department of
Public Health Service's [hereinafter USPHS] AIDS publication,1I9 that the compulsory testing provision serves the government's purpose. 120 However, the court misconstrued the'act,
the legislative findings and the federal publication. First, in
relying on the educational provision, the court disregarded the
fact that the act does not require AIDS education for all persons subject to the compulsory testing under the act. 121 Second,
115. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinction between an administrative and a criminal search. A government purpose is
administrative when the government is conducting the search to obtain information
to be used either to ensure compliance with government regulation or to protect
public health and safety rather than for criminal prosecution. Id.
116. See supra notes 100-101 and the accompanying text.
117. Love, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 743. The court rejected the Petitioners' argument
that the testing requirement constituted a criminal search because it was used to gather evidence for subsequent criminal prosecutions by relying on the education provision
of the act. Id. The court stated that "this argument, however, by focusing on the testing requirement, does not constitute a fair reading of the statute because the argument
ignores the significant educational provisions of the section." Id. See also supra notes
97·99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's treatment of this issue.
118. Love, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 742. The court refers to three findings by the
California Legislature in the CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE: (1) § 199.45(a) stat·
ing that AIDS poses an unprecedented health crisis in California; (2) § 199.4(h) stating that sexual contact is the primary means of transmission; and (3) § 199.46(k) stating
that prostitutes who pass the infection on to their clients are a specific group of concern. Id. Each of these legislative findings were passed under Chapter 1.14. 1986
Cal. Stat. ch. 1463, § 1 (enacting CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 199.45-199.51)
119. Guidelines for Counseling and Antibody Testing to Prevent HN Infection and
AIDS, 36 Morbidity and Mortality 509 (Aug. 14, 1987).
120. Love, 226 Cal. App. at 743. The court took judicial notice of guidelines for
AIDS prevention published by the United States Public Health Services and concluded
that the testing requirement has a preventative effect. Id. at 743 n.5.
121. See supra note 7. By relying on the educational provision of the act without
acknowledging that the act fails to require AIDS education across the board, the court
failed to consider whether the intent of the legislation was to prevent AIDS by two different means; education and deterrence. The education provision was designed to prevent AIDS by instructing prostitutes in the methods available to avoid contracting
and/or spreading the virus. The testing provision was designed to prevent the spread
of AIDS by creating an added deterrent for HIV positive prostitutes and sex offenders
from engaging in the illegal activity that would lead to a subsequent conviction. When
the provisions are examined separately, the testing provision is the equivalent of an
criminal search since the AIDS tests are conducted to obtain evidence to be used in
a criminal proceeding if there is a subsequent conviction.
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the court failed to interpret the context of the legislative findings. 122 Third, the court failed to interpret the rationale for the
USDPHS's recommendation for testing by concluding that
testing serves as a preventative measure without regarding the
distinct roles of both testing and education. 123 Furthermore, the
court failed to acknowledge the theory which allows the fruits
of an administrative search to be used in a criminal prosecution so long as the primary purpose for the search is administrative. 124
A finding that the governmental action at issue is administrative is an essential component of the "special needs"
test. 126 To ensure that the "special needs" exception is not
122. As specified in § 199.47(c) of Chapter 1.14, the intent was to "remove the
impediments to the expeditious development of an AIDS vaccine." CAL. HEALTH AND
SAFETY CODE § 199.47 (c) (West Supp. 1992). The court's reference to the finding that
AIDS poses an unprecedented health crisis ignores the legislative finding that "the
best hope of stemming the spread of the AIDS virus among the general public" is the
development of an AIDS vaccine and not compulsory AIDS testing. CAL. HEALTH AND
SAFETY CODE § 199.45 (a) & (b). The court's reference to the legislative finding
identifying sexual contact as the main means of transmission ignores the Legislature's
finding that the virus is also transmitted by "sharing hypodermic needles, contaminated
blood transfusions, and during pregnancy to the fetus." CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY
CODE § 199.46 (h). The court's reference to the legislative finding identifying prostitutes who pass the virus on to their clients as a specific group of concern in spreading the virus to the heterosexual community disregards the fact that the Legislature
identified "partners of high-risk groups (bisexual men and intravenous drug users)
... [as] the main means of transmitting the AIDS virus to the heterosexual community." CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 199.46 (k) (emphasis added)
The court also disregarded other important findings by the California Legislature
regarding AIDS such as the prohibition on compulsory AIDS testing and the extensive confidentiality provisions provided by the legislature. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY
CODE § 199.22 (prohibition on AIDS testing without the subjects written consent); CAL.
HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 199.21 (penalties for unauthorized disclosure of test
results). See also supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
123. Guidelines for Counseling and Antibody Testing to Prevent HN Infection and
AIDS, 36 Morbidity and Mortality 509 (Aug. 14, 1987). This publication states that
the primary "purposes of counseling and testing are to help uninfected individuals initiate and sustain behavior changes that reduce their risk of becoming infected and to
assist infected individuals in avoiding infecting others." Id. However, since the recommendations for reducing ones risk of infection are identical to the recommendations
for avoiding the infection of others, it appears that the testing serves merely to make
individuals aware of their HIV status "maximizing the benefits of early intervention."
Love, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 743 n.6 (quoting CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 144 (West
Supp. 1990».
124. See supra note 60 and accompanying text for a discussion of this theory. The
Supreme Court has made it clear that the application of the "special needs" doctrine
is not effected if the administrative search ultimately leads to evidence to be used in
a criminal prosecution so long as the primary purpose of the search was administrative. Because the court had found that the primary purpose behind the statute is controlling the spread of AIDS, the court could have used the primary/secondary theory
to dismiss the Petitioners' argument that the section involved a criminal search.
125. See, e.g., supra notes 34-36.
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extended beyond its narrow limits, this portion of the "special
needs" tests requires a more thorough analysis than that conducted by the Love court.126

B.

PART

Two:

BALANCING:

The "special needs" doctrine provides an exception to the
warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth
Amendment only when an individual's reduced expectation of
privacy is outweighed by a heightened governmental interest.127
This portion of the "special needs" test requires a court to
identify the privacy and government interests at issue and evaluate the search in light of those interests. 128
The court concluded that the privacy intrusion caused by
the compulsory testing provision of § 1202.6 is minimal. 129
However, the court reached this conclusion without making the
preliminary inquiry into whether the Petitioners' expectation
of privacy was reduced. 13o This determination is especially
crucial in an area in which, due to the nature of the AIDS virus
and the stigma attached to it, the privacy intrusion may be
heightened. lal In addition, the court was forced to hold that the
126. Love, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 743. The court merely concluded that the purpose
of the statute was AIDS prevention without finding that the testing scheme consti·
tutes an administrative search. Id.
127. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 698·99. To justify a departure from the
Constitution's warrant and probable cause requirements there must be both a reduced
expectation of privacy and a heightened governmental interest causing the balance to
be struck in favor of the government.ld. See also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., supra note 47.
129. Love, 226 Cal. App. at 746. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., supra notes 102·108 and accompanying text.
131. The devastating effects of receiving a positive AIDS test result has been the
subject of both legal and medical commentary. The bulk of this commentary suggests
that an individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in this area. See. e.g.,
Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 1278, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666
(1990). Faced with the constitutionality of mandatory AIDS testing under CAL.
HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 199.97, the California court of appeal acknowledged that
the psychological impact of receiving a positive test result is significant.ld. (citing Doe
v. Roe. 139 Misc. 2d 1072, 526 N.Y.S. 718,722 (1988». In Doe v. Roe. the New York
court denied a motion for an involuntary AIDS test in civil litigation. Doe, 139 Misc.
2d at 1072. The court's decision was based, in part on the psychosocial ramifications
of mandatory testing stating that "potential ostracism and psychic harm which may
occur from mandatory testing have resulted in most experts and organizations
including the Surgeon General of the United States, the United States
Public Health Seryices, The American Medical Association, and most state and local
health departments ... opposing mandatory nonvoluntary testing." Id. at 721. The State
of California has also demonstrated concern for the psychosocial impact of nonvoluntary
testing. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 199.21 and 199.22. These sections prohibit
involuntary testing except in very limited circumstances and provide for the confiden·
tiality of test results with civil and criminal penalties set for unauthorized disclosure.
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confidentiality provision of California Penal Code § 1202.1
applies with equal force to § 1202.6 in order to conclude that
the chemical analysis involves a minimal intrusion. 132
Furthermore, the court's inquiry into the government's
interest was cursory.l33 Exhibiting great deference to the state,
the court concluded that controlling the spread of AIDS is a
compelling governmental interest and that the testing provision furthers that interest. 134
The court's failure to give adequate consideration to either
the privacy or government interests precludes an honest
assessment of the balance between the two factors.
C.

PART THREE: BURGER CRITERIA:

The "special needs" doctrine furnishes an exception to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements only if the three criteria delineated in Burger are fulfilled. l36 However, the Loue court's analysis failed to address this
portion of the "special needs" test.
The court's failure to examine whether the Petitioners have a heightened expectation of privacy precludes an honest assessment of the privacy intrusion caused by
the testing and therefore prevents a valid balancing of privacy and government
interests under the "special needs" doctrine.
132. Love, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 747. Section 1202.1 provides that the test results
"shall be available to the prosecuting attorney upon request for the sole purpose of
preparing counts for a subsequent offense under Section 647(0 or sentence enhancement under Section 1202.85." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.1 (c) (emphasis added). Section
1202.6 provides that the test results shall be furnished to the district attorney upon
request. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6 (g). However, this section does not contain the
restriction on the district attorney's use found in § 1202.1 (c). The court found that
the language of the statute could be construed to. restrict dissemination by the district
attorney. Noting that "[s)tatutes are to be so construed, if their language permits,
as to render them valid and constitutional rather than invalid and unconstitutional."
Love, 226 Cal. App. at 745 (citing People v. Arnor, 12 Cal. 3d 20, 30, 114 Cal. Rptr. 765,
523 P.2d 1173 (1974» (brackets in original).
133. Love, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 740. The court identified the government's interest as AIDS prevention and stated that the control of a communicable disease is a valid
exercise of the state's police power. 1d.
134. Love, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 740. The Love court noted that:
[t)he adoption of measures for the protection of the public
health is universally conceded to be a valid exercise of the
police power of the state, as to which the legislature is necessarily vested with large discretion not only in determining
what are contagious and infectious diseases, but also in
adopting means for preventing the spread thereof.
1d. (quoting In re Johnson, 40 Cal. App. 242, 244, 180 P. 644). Considering the substantial controversy surrounding the AIDS epidemic and mandatory testing, the
court's blind deference to the legislature seems unreasonable in this area.
135. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying for a discussion of the three criteria.
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Since a finding on these requirements was disregarded, it is
uncertain whether the court would have found these criteria satisfied. 136 While it is probable that the court would have found
that the statutory scheme provides an adequate substitute for
a search warrant,137 the question remains whether the requirement of a warrant would frustrate the government interest
making a warrantless search necessary.138 In light of the limited number of situations in which the Supreme Court has found
that a warrant would frustrate the government interest,139 it
136. The Love court did, however, find that the government has a compelling
interest in preventing AIDS. Love, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 743.
137. The third prong of the Burger test requires that the testing program provides
a constitutionally adequate substitute for a search warrant. New York v. Burger, 482
U.S. at 691, 699. The Court held that the inspection scheme provided for an adequate
substitute for a search warrant because it: (1) informed persons subject to the inspections of the possibility of regular inspections; (2) limited the time, place and scope of
the inspections; and (3) limited the discretion of the inspection officers. [d. at 703. The
testing requirement in CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6 also provides for an adequate substitute by: (1) informing prostitutes of the prospect of being subject to mandatory AIDS
testing upon a conviction of§ 647 (b); (2) limiting the time, place and scope of the tests;
and (3) restricting the discretion of the persons conducting the tests. [d.
138. The second prong of the Burger test requires that a warrantless search must
be necessary to further the government's interest. Burger, 482 U.S. at 699.
139. The Supreme Court has routinely held that warrantless searches are necessary if the requirement of obtaining a warrant would frustrate the governmental
interest. See, e.g., Burger, 482 U.S. at 702; Skinner v. Railway Executive's Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 629-30. The Court held in Skinner that the requirement of a warrant
would frustrate the government interest in ensuring railroad safety. [d. at 624.
Because of the rate at which drugs and alcohol are eliminated from the bloodstream,
the Court held that the delay caused by obtaining a warrant could result in the loss
of evidence thus frustrating the government's interest. [d. In Burger, the Court held
that imposing the warrant requirement would frustrate the government's interest by
possibly alerting owners and operators thus frustrating the deterrent effect of "frequent and unannounced" inspections. Burger, 482 U.S. at 703 .
. The Supreme Court has found other circumstances that make a warrantless
search necessary because of the hindrance of the government's interest. First, the
Supreme Court has found that the need for "swift and informal disciplinary
procedures" may serve to justify a warrantless search. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 340. Second, the Court has found that unfamiliarity with the procedures for
obtaining a warrant may serve as a justification for a warrantless search. See
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339-40 (school officials); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709,722
(hospital administrators); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623 (railroad supervisors). The
Court in Skinner, found that railroad supervisors "have little occasion to become
familiar with the intricacies of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
'Imposing unwieldy warrant procedures ... upon supervisors, who would otherwise
have no reason to be familiar with such procedures, is simply unreasonable.'" [d.
at 623-24 (quoting Ortega, 480 U.S. at 722). Third, the Court found that if a
warrant would jeopardize an effective deterrent to prohibited conduct a warrantless
search may be justified. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 630. See also supra notes 69-70 and
accompanying text. Fourth, the Court has found that if a warrant would divert
resources while providing little additional protections, a warrantless search may be
justified. Treasury Employees' v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,666-67 (1989). See also
supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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is improbable that the court would have found this requirement
fulfilled. 140
.
By failing to address the three Burger criteria in the present context, the court did not apply a complete "special needs"
analysis and, therefore, failed to ensure that the Fourth
Amendment is not violated in the non-criminal context.
V.

CONCLUSION

The AIDS epidemic poses a formidable health crISIS in
California. The virus has killed thousands and has been the
occasion of hysteria, discrimination and stigmatization. The
urgency in combatting the virus has by this time become
apparent to all. However, the issue in Love v. Superior Court
is not whether there is a need for governmental action. Rather,
the issue is whether the action taken by the state of California
comports with the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
By allowing the government to compel prostitutes to submit to AIDS testing, the Love court has permitted our constitutional rights to fall prey to societal hysteria. The exteme
urgency generated by the need to combat the disease calls for
careful constitutional consideration of all laws passed under the
guise of dealing with the AIDS crisis. Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion in Skinner v. Railway Executive's Ass'n, cautioned that:
140. In the Love context it is apparent that the warrant requirement would not
frustrate the government's interest as it may have in Skinner and Burger. See supra
note 139. The evidence of the AIDS virus in the bloodstream is not eliminated over
time and the delay in obtaining a warrant would not result in the loss of evidence.
Neither would the possibility of alerting the convicted prostitutes of the impending
test frustrate the government interest. By the time the testing is ordered, the prostitutes have been charged and convicted and doubtlessly know of the impending
test. Any possible deterrent effect of the statute would not be frustrated by the possibility that a warrant may alert prostitutes of an impending test.
In addition, requiring a warrant in the Love situation does not create the problems
that the Supreme Court found make a warrant impracticable. See supra note 139. The
need for swift and informal disciplinary procedures is not present when convicting prostitutes and testing them for AIDS. Unfamiliarity with the warrant procedure is not
a problem because the statute orders the court to direct the testing. Resources would
not be diverted because the tests are directed as part of court proceedings and additional
costs would be minimal.
The only possible circumstance that is applicable to the present context is the possibility that the general deterrent effect of the statute would be jeopardized by requiring the state to obtain a warrant before testing prostitutes for AIDS. However, this
circumstance is applicable only to prostitutes who have tested positive under the
statute, and then only if the state would not be able to obtain a warrant and if the penalty enhancement provision is likely to cause these prostitutes to forego work.
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[h]istory teaches that grave threats to liberty
often come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure.
The World War II relocation-camp cases.
Hirabayashi v. United States, Korematsu v.
United States and the Red Scare and the
McCarthy-Era internal subversion cases,
Schenck v. United States, Dennis v. United
States are only the most extreme reminders
that when we allow fundamental freedoms to
be sacrificed in the name of real or perceived
exigency, we invariably come to regret it.141
Since the addition of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, the Supreme Court has carved out several
exceptions to the Amendment's privacy safeguards, but none
so broad as the developing "special needs" doctrine. Since its
inception, the diversity of the "special needs" application has
increased dramatically, from searches of the premises of highly regulated business, to searches of the home, and ultimately to searches of the human body. The "special needs" test
attempts to restrict the application of the exception by ensuring that it does not overreach its parameters. While the
Supreme Court regards it as an adequate substitute for the
Fourth Amendment's traditional privacy safeguards, it provides
little protection for our Fourth Amendment rights.
Rather than applying the limited protection afforded by the
"special needs" test, the Love court disregarded both judicial
and constitutional safeguards. In light of the Love court's
analysis it is difficult to imagine a situation, short of blanket
testing, which would not withstand the courts scrutiny. The
complex social realities of the AIDS epidemic demand greater
vigilance against such drastic measures as mandatory testing.

141. Skinner v. Railway Executives' Ass'n. 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989).
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